CRUSH THE CELL

Most post 9-11 counter terrorism budget increases have been a massive waste of money. 

 

• Spending for all national intelligence operations has doubled in recent years, to a grand total of about $44 billion a year.  (p. 262)

 

• (The creation of DHS and the DNI) was a classic Washington solution: create a new agency, hire more bureaucrats, and increasingly outsource the work to contractors. (p. 148)

 

• The most important work in protecting our country since 9-11 has been accomplished with the capacity that was in place when the event happened … I firmly believe that those huge budget increases have not significantly contributed to our post 9-11 security. (p. 263)

 

• At NYPD, we built two new organizations (the Counter Terrorism Bureau and the Intelligence Division) … but we did so within the existing resources of a shrinking police department …. (p. 148)

 

• As you will see, relative to the billions of dollars in new money being spent, most of the effective [intelligence] operations are not that expensive. (p. 148)

 

The Department of Homeland Security – not really.  The Director of National Intelligence – not really.  Bigger budgets mean better protection – not really.

 

• In my estimation, the Washington office of DHS hasn’t yet proven its worth…[They have] doled out millions of dollars in homeland security pork to state and local authorities….with very little effect on our overall security. (p. 223)

 

• The Department of Homeland Security was a bad idea. (p. 259)

 

• The Director of National Intelligence isn’t really that; instead his title should be “the coordinator of information sharing and the chief cajoler of those agencies that actually collect intelligence and run real intelligence operations.” (p. 260)

 

• Notwithstanding these tremendous budget increases, the most important work in protecting our country since 9-11 has been accomplished with the capacity that was in place when the event happened, not with any of the new capability bought since 9-11. (p. 263)

 

• The next president should start off his or her counterterrorism effort by asking each agency (primarily CIA and FBI) to delineate its top layer of activity, representing at least 10 percent of the budget, that contributes to defending our nation from terrorist threats. (p. 263)

 

Sensitive and creative intelligence collection operations are the key to counter terrorism -- not information sharing. And intelligence collection operations are a messy business both at home and abroad.

 

• The primary means of information gathering involves various types of human sources, the most important of which are confidential informants and undercover agents. (p. 155)

 

• We have consistently failed to penetrate the organizations that threaten us.   (p. 164)

 

• This doesn’t mean we should be reckless, just significantly bolder in recruiting and deploying agents against the terrorist target. (p. 163)

 

• I strongly support [the NSA wiretap program because] it enhances our ability to prevent future attacks … Had the President asked Congress for this privilege explicitly… he would have received their support. (p. 167)

 

• Spying can be a sordid business, but it is the key to our success in defeating al Qaeda’s immediate operational capability.  The subject should be discussed more openly; only then can we fully understand its importance and inherent risks.       (p. 168)

 

• I’m convinced … leaders can form bipartisan partnerships with oversight committees that will strengthen our intelligence ability while ensuring our civil liberties are protected. (p. 168)

 

Al Qaeda was under-estimated prior to 9-11 and over-estimated after 9-11; both miscalculations were disastrous for the U.S.

 

• In October 2000 [during the Presidential debates], just eleven months before 9/11, terrorism wasn’t an important issue to either Presidential candidate [Vice President Al Gore or Governor George Bush], nor to the press, nor to the public asking the questions [at the debate] … the entire country was asleep to the threat. (p. 20)  

 

• Al Qaeda has a clear modus operandi ... even as it evolves … To know the terrorist requires the study of history and the analysis of true modus operandi. “Experts” who don’t know the history, the ideology or even the current capabilities of radical militant Islam should be stifled.  (p. 25, p. 268-9)

 

• The most common trap is to think, “If I were a terrorist I would do this”… we must base our analysis of the enemy on a careful study of how they operate and what they say, not on idle speculation. (p. 268) 

 

• [Over-estimating the terrorists’ capability] encourages the “self-paralysis” that the terrorists hope to achieve with relatively modest attacks. (p. 268)

 

• By whipping ourselves into a frenzy before and after an attack, we amplify the attack’s impact … The so-called tough guys of terrorism are unwittingly contributing to their own self-fulfilling prophecies of doom. (p. 268)

 

• Exaggerating al Qaeda’s power isn’t tantamount to playing it safe. It only clouds our view of this already clandestine enemy and contributes to the psychological terror they hope to invoke.  (p. 14)

 

• The fact remains that for six years since 9-11 they’ve been unable to deliver a second punch [to the homeland]. (p. 13)

 

So why hasn’t al Qaeda attacked us again since 9-11?

 

• They haven’t attacked again because, thus far, they haven’t been able to… they aren’t waiting for a special day or bigger target…but if al Qaeda could hit us tomorrow, they would—and I wouldn’t be shocked if they did. (p. 12)

          

• They’ll attack when they’re ready, for real terrorists operate in real time. (p. 12)

 

• They have limitations – personal, organizational, and ideological – and they’ve proven their limits by their inability to attack again in the United States since 9-11. (p. 282)

 

Iran and Hezbollah are very different terrorists than al Qaeda.  Iran and Hezbollah are restrained, they react to pressure from governments, al Qaeda does not. They should not be lumped together, each requires a different response.

 

• My focus was on al Qaeda, but Hezbollah, long a killer of Americans was never far from my mind.  (p.71)

 

• Hezbollah, with the support of its Iranian patrons, invented the modern concept of Islamic suicide terrorism. (p. 78)

 

• Iran’s heated rhetoric calling for the annihilation of Israel and rants against the United States notwithstanding, most countries consider Iran to be a rational actor …. The rest of the world knows that the threat will be focused on the United States. (p. 87)

 

• [Hezbollah] realized they could get away with a certain degree of indirect support for Palestinian terrorist groups as long as it was discreet and limited to Israel and the occupied territories. (p. 81) 

 

• Their history is soaked in the blood of Americans (mostly in the 1980s), but they have been restrained in their terrorist activity outside of Israel since 1996. (p. 88)

 

• Iran’s support for Hezbollah, their meddling in the Iraq war, and their insistence on developing a nuclear program provide major challenges …. (p. 88)

 

We have the best Special Operations Forces in the world, so why can’t we get high value terrorists and war criminals like bin Ladin, Zawahiri, Imad Mugneya (20 years), Karadic and Miladic, Aideed, etc. ?

 

• The heroism and fighting skill of JSOC [Delta Force] is unsurpassed, but America’s most wanted men have eluded their grasp for years. (p. 109)

 

• Cabinet heads deftly shift responsibility [for risky special ops] to others and keep a long list of excuses handy: the intelligence is no good; we don’t have authority to conduct assassinations; this is a local responsibility; it’s somebody else’s job… the process has been dysfunctional, both in the field and in Washington. (p. 122)

 

• One organization, either CIA or JSOC, should be assigned the special operations mission and given both the military and intelligence tools to get the job done. (p. 125-6)

 

• Special Forces trainers and shooters will be very busy in Iraq, no matter who is inaugurated in January of 2009.  (p. 131)

 

NYPD was successful because Ray Kelly had guts and vision and was backed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg.

 

• Kelly was unwilling to relinquish full control of counter terrorism activity to the FBI. (p. 172)

 

• [Kelly] recruited and hired David Cohen… a thirty year veteran of CIA, [who] had been head of the Agency’s clandestine service. (p. 172)

 

• [Kelly] kept a very tight rein on operations but always gave Cohen plenty of room to improvise. (p. 172)

 

• Kelly had Bloomberg’s full support … bold leadership is what the city needed, and Kelly and Bloomberg delivered.  (p. 173)

 

• NYPD detectives are less formally educated [than the FBI special agent] but tend to be older and more streetwise … they come from NYPD crime units … there is simply no better experience for an investigator than can be gained in the streets and detective squads of NYPD.  (p. 193-4)

 

Defensive strategies have limited value; We live in an open society with countless targets.  It is not feasible to protect every target like a fortress. However, some--like the new Freedom Tower, require special attention.  It is not a normal building, but an icon to the “global war on terror.”

 

• When I learned of the design of the Freedom Tower, I became very concerned not only for the safety of its inhabitants but of all of lower Manhattan, which would be economically devastated by a third attack against the World Trade Center.      (p. 244)

 

• The pressure was on me to come up with a solution to a building I was beginning to feel should not be built at all. (p. 252)

 

• Silverstein [the building developer]… said: “We have read the recommendations of the Police Department and accept them in full … The Freedom Tower…will be completely redesigned.” (p. 253)

 

• I spent considerable time [at NYPD] denying requests for jersey barriers, ugly concrete planters …If … New York were to become an armed camp of barriers, walls and closed streets it could undermine people’s confidence… (p. 244)

 

• The vast majority of buildings need only be designed to safety codes for normal construction … but for those targets that beckon al Qaeda the appropriate investment must be made... (p. 255)

Protect the Border

 

• We need to keep terrorists... from entering or exiting the country …The more isolated [homegrown terrorists] are from foreign operatives, the better. (p. 273)

 

• Fences work … I served on the DMZ in Korea. (p. 273)

 

• The establishment of a national identity card would go a long way. (p. 273)

 

• As we tighten up our coastlines, weekend boaters may have to give up some of their unregulated privileges so that the Coast Guard can track and identify all boats in US waters [with beacons]. (p. 273)

Most terrorist attacks are insignificant unless you over-react; Weapons of mass destruction are the exception. Fortunately, constructing or procuring a WMD is very difficult.

 

• CBRN weapons can enable a terrorist organization to achieve a strategic impact on our nation in a single attack…. (p. 195)

 

• But fortunately …. Their efforts to attain even one such weapon have been largely ineffective. (p. 195)

 

• Nuclear weapons … [were] my worst nightmare … [but I was] more concerned about a less devastating but far more likely device, an improvised radiological device, or “dirty bomb.” (p. 198)

 

• But we learned [from radiological experts] that the danger from fall out, or floating particles of contaminated dust, wasn’t nearly as severe as assumed.       (p. 199)

 

• We were preoccupied with preventing [a CBRN attack so we entered into] … the business of local non-proliferation of dangerous materials. (p. 210)

We will be attacked by terrorists again. If our politicians and news outlets overreact we hand the terrorists a victory they do not deserve.  We must not self terrorize.

 

• The Israelis sent many messages with their response [quick clean up after an attack]: “These bombs won’t defeat us. In fact they don’t even disrupt our way of life... we honor their death [of victims of terrorist attacks] with life, with resilience against the killers. (p. 279)

 

• If [the next attack] wasn’t part of a strategic threat but falls within the cost of living in a free society – like the disgruntled postal worker… we musn’t overreact.  It is time to put the terrorist threat in perspective. (p. 282)

 

But, until this movement subsides, al Qaeda and related groups will continue to attempt to kill us. 

• I never underestimated the determination and lethality of this loosely linked band of killers…We must find and crush their cells at every opportunity; with focused and relentless determination.  (p. 13, p. 282)